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Abstract 
Using AIS/DHS data for Tanzania in 2003-4, 2007-8 and 2011-12 and borrowing from the 
methodology used in Parkhurst (2010) we analyse the changing relationship between wealth and 
HIV prevalence in Tanzania. Findings are tabulated, graphed and discussed. 
We find the relationship is multifaceted and dynamic: women are disproportionately affected in all 
wealth quintiles and eǆpeƌieŶĐe a stƌoŶgeƌ ͚ǁealth effeĐt͛; soŵe gƌoups eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶ iŶĐƌease iŶ 
prevalence even as population prevalence declines. Relative wealth and poverty are associated with 
increased prevalence, suggesting that structural drivers create a variety of risk situations – as well as 
protective factors – affecting different groups.   
We also consider data on testing refusals: wealthier men were consistently more likely to decline 
testing.  Continuing to unpack this complex and shifting relationship is necessary in order to fully 
understand the structural drivers of HIV transmission and access of testing sevices, enabling the 
formulation of appropriate policy responses. 
Introduction 
Although there was a general awareness in the early years of the HIV/AIDS epidemic that those of 
higher socio-economic status, such as school teachers, had high rates of infection (Hamoudi and 
Birdsall 2004),  HIV/AIDS has long been characterised as a disease of poverty, with explanations for 
and responses to the epidemic framed within a poverty narrative (World Bank 1999; Hope 2001; 
Whiteside 2002; Masanjala 2007). The evidence, however, does not necessarily support this 
narrative, with early acknowledgments that the wealthy were impacted (Chao et al. 1994) 
supplemented with later findings from nationally representative  surveys  that emphasise the 
complexity of the relationships between wealth and prevalence (Wojcicki 2005; Mishra et al. 2007; 
Fortson 2008), and, in some cases, suggest that it is the wealthiest that have the highest prevalence 
rates (Msisha et al. 2008; Parkhurst 2010). These recent studies typically use data from 
representative demographic surveys, an improvement on previous methodological approaches that 
focused on gathering data at antenatal clinics (Bennel 2004), and in general report a range of 
different correlations between relative wealth and HIV prevalence in a number of countries in sub-
“ahaƌaŶ AfƌiĐa.  The ƌelatioŶship iŶ soŵe Đases is seeŶ to ďe positiǀelǇ ŵoŶotoŶiĐ, otheƌ tiŵes ͚U-
shaped͛ ǁith ďoth the ǁealthiest aŶd pooƌest segŵeŶts of the populatioŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐing higher rates 
of HIV prevalence.  For example, Parkhurst (2010) finds that HIV prevalence increases across wealth 
quintiles in a number of countries for men and women, though this correlation differs by both GDP 
per capita and the HIV prevalence rate of the population as a whole. Mishra et al (2007) find that 
even when controlling for likely co-factors ;foƌ eǆaŵple uƌďaŶ ǀs. ƌuƌal dǁelliŶgͿ the ͚ǁealth effeĐt͛ 
remains significant. The relationship between wealth and HIV is, statistically, experienced differently 
ďǇ geŶdeƌ; tǇpiĐallǇ ƌelatiǀe ǁealth seeŵs to aĐt ŵoƌe shaƌplǇ as a ͚ƌisk faĐtoƌ͛ foƌ ǁoŵeŶ than for 
men. Wojcicki (2005) in a review of 36 studies that specifically focus on the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and HIV for women, reported that ͚fifteen found no association between SES 
and HIV infection, twelve found an association between high SES and HIV infection, eight found an 
association between low SES and infection, aŶd the ƌesults fƌoŵ oŶe ǁeƌe ŵiǆed͛ ;WojĐiĐki ϮϬϬϱͿ 
again emphasising that relative wealth is often an important factor, though it was noted that the 
socioeconomic status of male partners is also influential in shaping patterns of infection (Wojcicki 
2005). Whilst the evidence is heterogeneous in that there is no one universal correlation (Parkhurst 
2010), contrary to the poverty narrative, ͚HIV/AID“ does Ŷot dispƌopoƌtioŶallǇ affeĐt the pooƌeƌ in 
sub-Saharan Africa͛ (Mishra et al. 2007).  
There are, however, limitations with the data used for these analyses, as they are all based on panel 
or survey data, and can only give snapshots at a specific point in time, as opposed to longitudinal 
surveys which track the same population over a sustained period of time and hence can capture 
changes in incidence rates for different wealth groups. Longitudinal studies are therefore better 
placed to shed light on how behaviour changes over time, and whether the assumptions noted 
above are borne out.  However, as noted in Johnston (2013),  sadly these studies are few and far 
between, in part inhibited by the cost of repeatedly surveying the same population over a number of 
years, with the results from the only three available studies portraying a mixed picture (Johnston 
2013).  Johnston (ibid)  notes that whilst one study reports declining incidence for wealthier men but 
not women (Lopman et al. 2007), two other studies conducted in South Africa over a similar time 
period reported different results (Hargreaves et al. 2002; Barnighausen et al. 2007). However, 
neither of the studies conducted in South Africa found a statistical correlation between increasing 
incidence and poverty, suggesting that this evidence is broadly supportive of the conclusion that 
Mishra et al (2007) came to with their analysis conducted using prevalence data. Whichever method 
is used, it seems that the evidence to-date consistently contradicts the poverty-HIV narrative. 
However, despite widespread acknowledgment of these findings (Fenton 2004; Shelton et al. 2005; 
Gillespie et al. 2007), the response to the epidemic  remains firmly rooted in a poverty narrative, 
best illustrated by FentoŶ͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶ that despite the data, ͚reducing poverty will be at the core of 
a long-term, sustainable solution to HIV/AIDS (Fenton, 2004, p1187). This is echoed across the 
literature, with a range of other studies emphasising the role of poverty (Booysen Fle and 
Summerton 2002; Stillwaggon 2002; Freedman and Poku 2005; Kalichman et al. 2006; Dodoo et al. 
2007; Kalipeni and Ghosh 2007; Lopman et al. 2007; Weiser et al. 2007; Chaturaka and Senaka 2010; 
Mufune 2014). Whilst UNAID“ ĐoŶtiŶues to eŵphasise the Ŷeed to ͚kŶoǁ Ǉouƌ epideŵiĐ͛ aŶd foƌ 
interventions to be evidence-based (Wilson and Halperin 2008), this advice is not currently being 
heeded,  and hence the poverty narrative has taken on a paradigmatic quality.   
Several factors underpin this lack of consideration of the role of relative wealth, and the continued 
focus on poverty. First, it was assumed that the wealthy would be the first to change their 
behaviours in response to the epidemic (Bujra 2006), a view couched in rational behavioural terms; 
the wealthiest will be more likely to respond to educational campaigns, and that they can afford 
condoms and/or treatment and therefore will do so. However, evidence from recent studies show 
that risk behaviours are in some cases still correlated positively with wealth (Kongnyuy et al. 2006; 
Awusabo-Asare and Annim 2008), suggesting that anticipated changes in behaviour have not always 
materialised. 
A second factor is the observation that wealth is often correlated with negative health outcomes 
simply because the wealthy live longer (Beegle and de Walque 2009). This issue has been prominent 
in discussions of the correlations between HIV and wealth, with general agreement that as the 
wealthy have greater access to ARV treatment and live longer, prevalence rates for the wealthy are 
biased upwards and thus this is a statistical anomaly that can be ignored. There is certainly a strong 
degree of truth to this assumption, as demographic evidence across the continent reports longer life 
expectancies for the wealthy. However, the issue of biases in the data related to post-infection 
impacts on household income and wealth are often not addressed, despite evidence suggesting that 
post- infection morbidity is associated with a reduction in household income. For example, 
Bachmann and Booysen found that income and expenditure was lower in households which had an 
HIV infected member than those that did not (Bachmann and Booysen 2003), whilst a study on a tea 
plantation in Kenya found that HIV-infected workers earned significantly lower incomes than other 
workers in the two years before retirement or death (Fox et al. 2004). Studies on the impact of 
HIV/AIDS related mortality on households (death rather than illness), emphasise that although 
household͛s eǆpeŶdituƌe/iŶĐoŵe often recover from suffering an HIV/AIDS related death after  a 
period of around 5 years (Seeley et al. 2010), by inference this suggests that there is a negative 
morbidity impact to recover from. Although the evidence base for the impact of HIV/AIDS related 
morbidity is small and in urgent need of additional research, the limited evidence highlights that 
households do experience reductions in income post-infection, suggesting that this will bias 
prevalence data for poorer wealth quintiles.  
Third, there is evidence to suggest that positive correlations between wealth and HIV status 
disappear when samples are divided into rural and urban samples, reflecting that fact that the 
majority of the wealthy live in urban areas (Beegle and de Walque 2009). An analysis of DHS data 
available for sub-Saharan countries, using a relative measure of wealth, found that in rural areas, 
poverty was not associated with higher HIV prevalence, but in urban areas the urban poor are 
disproportionately affected (Magadi 2013). These findings further muddy the picture, illustrating 
that different forms of poverty may or may not be related to enhanced HIV risk, and that the 
interaction between poverty and other contextual and structural factors are also important to 
account for. 
A final observation that is often repeated in the literature links HIV and poverty because Africa is 
both the poorest continent and home to the majority of those living with HIV/AIDS 
(Mbirimtengerenji 2007), an analysis that focuses on context, rather than patterns of behaviour and 
outcomes, reflecting the fertile terrain that Stillwaggon (2002) refers to.  However, an alternative 
view would suggest that Africa is home to the majority of those living with HIV because this was 
where the epidemic originated (Iliffe 2006). 
Whilst there are examples of excellent studies that address the role of  wealth  in the HIV epidemic 
(Bujra 2006), there are a number of compelling reasons for revisiting this issue. Prominent amongst 
them is the availability of new data which enables us to update previous work (Parkhurst 2010) to 
assess to what extent the optimism around behavioural change and declining prevalence rates for 
the wealthiest has played out.  Secondly, there are few, if any, policies that incorporate the wealthy 
;oƌ ͚ǁealthieƌ͛Ϳ within the target population, with recent economic interventions such as 
microfinance and cash transfers that are becoming  increasingly popular in HIV prevention efforts 
that seek to addƌess ͚stƌuĐtuƌal͛ dƌiǀeƌs (Kim and Watts 2005; Baird et al. 2012), targeted primarily at 
poor women and girls.  The advent of treatment as prevention (Cohen et al. 2011; Thigpen et al. 
2012), and the global focus on expanding access to A‘V͛s foƌ those iŶfeĐted (UNAIDS 2013), to some 
extent at the expense of prevention efforts, are also more recent themes that require attention, and 
especially concerning the assumptions around enhanced access of these services by the wealthy 
(Obermeyer et al. 2013). This has not been addressed in great detail in the literature to date, yet is a 
crucial component in the overall debate, especially in relation to the question of whether the 
prevalence data contains biases. Finally, a very limited number of studies have engaged with this 
topic previously. Bujra (2006) provides a critical analysis of mainstream economic approaches to 
transmission, and locates the high rates of HIV seen in wealthy women in Tanzania within the 
context of processes of class formation and the reinforcement of class identity (Bujra 2006). Beyond 
this, convincing explanations are scarce, especially within the economics discipline, which continues 
to frame transmission within rational terms (Philipson and Posner 1995; Oster 2005; Oster 2007; 
Oster 2012), emphasising the need for a renewed focus. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Firstly, we provide a brief introduction to the history 
of the epidemic in Tanzania, and then present an updated statistical analysis using recent data from 
Tanzania. We then critically assess competing explanations for the analysis, before discussing further 
implications of our results in relation to the current policy agenda and the structural drivers 
literature (Gupta et al. 2008; Auerbach et al. 2011). It is important to note at this point that we 
acknowledge poverty will be an important factor in some settings.  However, our assertion is that 
the framing of HIV as a disease of poverty is at best inaccurate, at worst something that diverts 
attention from the role of wealth, and thus only serves to dilute international efforts to combat the 
spread and impact of the virus. A renewed focus on the roles of, and interactions between, both 
wealth and poverty, and how these produce different health outcomes across the population (see 
O͛LaughliŶ, B, this issueͿ, is required. 
The Tanzanian epidemic: New evidence on the relationship between wealth and HIV 
The first cases of AIDS in Tanzania were recorded in Kagera region in 1983 (Ministry of Health 2003; 
Iliffe 2006), though it is likely that the virus entered the Uganda- Tanzania border region in the mid 
to late ϭϵϳϬ͛s(Iliffe 2006). By 1986, just a few years later, the virus had penetrated all mainland 
regions (Iliffe 2006)1. Whilst is it difficult to build up an accurate picture of prevalence and trends 
duƌiŶg the ϭϵϵϬ͛s, as pƌeǀaleŶĐe ƌates ǁeƌe estiŵates ďased oŶ ŵeasuƌeŵeŶts takeŶ pƌiŵaƌilǇ at 
Antenatal Clinics, there is some evidence to suggest that prevalence peaked in Tanzania in 2001 
(Asamoah-Odei et al. 2004). More recent data, based on the Tanzania HIV/AIDS Indicator surveys of 
2003-04, 2007-08 and 2011-12 (discussed in more detail below), show a national prevalence rate of 
7% in 2003-04, that has declined to 5.1% in 2011-12 (TACAIDS 2005; TACAIDS et al. 2013). At 
present, on the mainland, prevalence rates are higher in urban areas in comparison with rural areas, 
and vary widely between regions, ranging from 11% in Iringa to 2.1% in Dodoma.  
The government response2 to the epidemic commenced as early as 1985 with the establishment of 
the National AIDS Control Programme(Ministry of Health 1998), and a number of medium term 
plans to address the epidemic followed (Ministry of Health 1998). The priorities in the third year plan 
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 For a thorough assessment of the spread of the virus across Tanzania, see Illife (2006) 
2
 For a detailed view of the resonse to the epidemic in Tanzania, see Garbus, L. (2004). HIV/AIDS in Tanzania. 
San Fransisco, AIDS Policy Research Center, University of California  
included targeting commercial sex workers, vulnerable groups, and also poverty reduction 
strategies, amongst recognition that gender issues, including access to education for girls and an 
adverse cultural environment for women, were also important issues to address. Following the DHS 
surveys, which provided greater accuracy on population prevalence rates, the 2008-2012 plan 
(Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2007) continued to pursue strategies that acknowledge a 
broad range of social drivers. With the growing global focus on treatment, the rollout of 
Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) was slow, with the WHO estimating that there were no patients in on 
ART (WHO 2002). By 2005, 19,600 individuals were on ART, though this was less than 7% of those 
requiring it (WHO 2005). However, supported by large volumes of external funding, ART coverage 
was estimated to have risen to 69% by 2012 (The Global Fund 2013), though a significant funding 
gap remains if Tanzania are to achieve the 90% treatment coverage by 2020 targets set by UNAIDS in 
2014 (UNAIDS 2014). 
Tanzania has arguably the most comprehensive nationally representative data available on HIV 
prevalence, with three HIV/AIDS indicator surveys now completed (as noted above). Following 
Parkhurst (2010), we include the most recent data from the 2011/12 Tanzanian survey to update his 
analysis3. Below, we conduct a trend analysis over three time periods – 2003-4, 2007-8 and 2011-12. 
An important qualifier to emphasise is that this data is not cohort, or panel, data: it does not track 
the incidence of HIV/AIDS transmission within a closed group of respondents – instead, it gives three 
sepaƌate ͚sŶapshot͛ piĐtuƌes of the pƌeǀaleŶĐe at different intervals. However, it is to be hoped that, 
with broad population coverage, each snapshot is reasonably representative and can give us some 
insight into the changing distribution of HIV/AIDS in Tanzania over the last decade.   
The measure of wealth in the DHS surveys is based on an ͚asset iŶdeǆ͛ iŶĐoƌpoƌatiŶg a ƌaŶge of 
indicators including ownership of certain consumer durables, housing conditions, water access and 
so oŶ, to ŵeaŶiŶgfullǇ ƌaŶk iŶdiǀidual ƌespoŶdeŶts͛ ƌelatiǀe ǁealth iŶ oŶe of fiǀe ƋuiŶtiles foƌ the 
country. This approach tends to correspond poorly with those rankings produced using monetary 
measures such as income or expenditure and alternative explanations have been put forward for 
this (Johnston 2013): however, monetary measures can fluctuate particularly dramatically in poorer 
countries where incomes can be very volatile, or come from a mixture of formal and informal 
economic activity poorly suited to easy ranking. In these circumstances, asset measures seem likely 
to giǀe a ŵoƌe ƌeliaďle piĐtuƌe of a household͛s loŶg-run welfare levels, and indeed have been shown 
to perform well in predicting health and educational outcomes (Wall and Johnston 2008): this 
evidence suggests it is suitable for this area. The data available for the first period excludes Zanzibar; 
for subsequent periods data is available for Zanzibar but in the interest of comparing like with like, 
we continue to exclude Zanzibar from the analysis4.  
There are two major criticisms to address before undertaking this quantitative analysis dealing with 
highly-aggregated data. The first comes from Bujra (2006), who correctly points out that wealth 
gƌoups aƌe Ŷot a peƌfeĐt suďstitute foƌ ͚Đlass͛, aŶd that ŵuĐh Ƌualitatiǀe uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ĐaŶ ďe 
obscured by an overly-ƋuaŶtitatiǀe, aggƌegated foĐus: tƌue, ͚ǁealth ƋuiŶtile͛ does Ŷot adeƋuatelǇ 
Đaptuƌe ͚Đlass͛ – the profoundly social (and sexual) relations upon which the spread of HIV/AIDS is 
predicated cannot be represented in a headcount which applies these asset-based distinctions and 
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 All data is available from www.dhsprogram.com 
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 Incidentally, the inclusion of Zanzibar does not substantially alter the overall impression of the data. 
cannot portray interrelations within and between the corresponding groups of people. This detracts 
from putting forward our results as a complete aŶsǁeƌ: ƌatheƌ, the ͚ǁealth ƋuiŶtile͛ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶs 
should be situated within, and compared against, qualitative studies which look to understand those 
interrelations; furthermore, this analysis occupies an important middle ground between 
(irreplaceable) qualitative and theoretical frameworks, and the inevitable top-level analysis of the 
highest aggregation – it prevents lazy conclusions that since overall prevalence has declined, this 
decline must be uniform across the population. There can be no single optimal level of analysis 
which all studies must follow; far greater understanding can emerge from reading across studies 
conducted at different levels of analysis. 
The seĐoŶd ŵajoƌ ĐƌitiĐisŵ ;Gillespie et al ϮϬϬϳͿ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs the iŶadeƋuaĐǇ of the teƌŵs ͚ƌiĐh͛ and 
͚pooƌ͛ iŶ loǁ-iŶĐoŵe ĐouŶtƌies ǁheƌe alŵost all aƌe ͚the pooƌ͛. This criticism, though important, is in 
large part semantics: even if three or four quintiles of the population come below a given poverty 
line, this does not imply homogeneity of life quality or prospects among this population majority. 
The ƌelatioŶal teƌŵs ͚ƌiĐheƌ͛ aŶd ͚pooƌeƌ͛ still applǇ. For one example, an economically-induced 
decision to sell unsafe sex once or twice during temporary hardship is not equivalent to the 
economically-induced decision to sell unsafe sex repeatedly during prolonged hardship, in terms of 
life quality or risk of infection. 
Below we present data on HIV prevalence rates and testing refusal rates. Table 1 shows HIV 
prevalence, by gender and wealth quintile, across all three time periods; it also shows the chi-square 
trend test which is shown to be statistically significant in all cases. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the 
prevalence rates graphically, split by gender and wealth quintile, for each time period, with 95% 
confidence intervals constructed.  Table 2 shows the proportion of survey respondents who declined 
the HIV blood test also by wealth quintile and gender. It is worth noting that overall coverage of HIV 
testing was influenced by some potential respondents not being interviewed, and also that the 
measure for refusal to tests is different in the first survey. 
  
Table 1: Tabulated HIV prevalence in Tanzania across three time periods. (All data: DHS/AIS) 
Figure 1: HIV prevalence in Tanzania, 2003-04. (Data: DHS/AIS.) 
 
Figure 2: HIV prevalence in Tanzania, 2007-08. (Data: DHS/AIS.) 
 
Figure 3: HIV prevalence in Tanzania, 2011-12. (Data: DHS/AIS.) 
 
 
 
A number of simple observations regarding the socioeconomic distribution of HIV/AIDS can be 
made. First, in all cases the chi-square indicates the presence of a trend between wealth quintile and 
prevalence. It is clear that the overall prevalence is declining; however, there are a number of 
examples where the prevalence within a wealth quintile rises from one period to the next (for 
example, among poorer women between 2003-04 and 2007-08). It is also evident that prevalence 
among women is consistently and significantly greater than that among men, by a far greater factor 
than the 1:1.2 ratio estimated by the earlier UNAIDS data (Bennel 2004). 
The results for the earliest period demonstrate a positive monotonic relationship between wealth 
and prevalence for both sexes, particularly strong for women: the prevalence of the wealthiest 
quintile of women being almost four times as great as the poorest. In the second period the 
relationship between prevalence and relative wealth becomes less straightforward, in line with the 
hypothesis that, as an epidemic matures, the brunt of new infections passes to poorer individuals as 
wealthier and better-educated people respond to public health messages: among men, it takes on 
the U-shaped distribution Parkhurst (2010) finds in a number of other African countries, with the 
decline more pronounced among the middle and richer quintiles. Among women, the relationship is 
less clear still: significant decreases in the prevalence for the wealthier and middle wealth quintiles 
are matched by increases in the two poorest quintiles. However, a wealthy woman is still more than 
twice as likely to be HIV-positive as one of the poorest: a notable narrowing of the gap from the 
previous period, but still a stark contrast.  
The shifts in the relationship between relative wealth and HIV prevalence are different again 
between the second and third data periods. Again, the overall prevalence declines – more 
significantly for men than for women. For women, declines in the poorer and wealthiest groups, 
accompanied with slight increases for the third and fourth quintiles, combine to restore the 
monotonic relationship between wealth and HIV prevalence; however, the gap between the 
prevalence rate of the wealthiest and poorest women continues to narrow. Whilst not as strongly 
pronounced as in the earlier distribution, the importance of relative wealth as a risk factor is 
ƌeiteƌated, aŶd the hǇpothesis of ŵatuƌiŶg epideŵiĐs shiftiŶg ͚doǁŶǁaƌds͛ through the class system5 
is challenged by this finding. The distribution for men in 2011-12 is less clear: a decline in prevalence 
is observable for each quintile except the middle (which experiences a very slight rise) and the 
wealthiest quintile retains the greatest prevalence, but there is no straightforward pattern to the 
wealth-prevalence relationship. This should not imply that relative wealth or poverty has become 
irrelevant to the HIV/AIDS epidemic – and how could it, when it remains such a clear factor in the 
female experience of HIV/AIDS? Instead, it again reinforces that our understandings should be 
nuanced and context-specific, and should consider a number of specific pathways which may seem 
to Ŷegate eaĐh otheƌ͛s ǀisiďilitǇ at this leǀel of aŶalysis.  
It is iŵpoƌtaŶt to ƌeiteƌate heƌe that ͚ƌelatiǀe ǁealth͛ is Ŷot a fiǆed ǀaƌiaďle; iŶdeed, ďoth ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ 
seŶse͛ aŶd suďstaŶtial eǀideŶĐe ;Noŵďo ϮϬϬϳ; Hodge ϮϬϬϴͿ iŶdiĐate that households affeĐted ďǇ 
HIV/AIDS typically face the double burden of a temporary increase in their necessary expenditure 
(particularly healthcare and food) and a decrease in their productivity and income (through loss of 
labour to disease, death, and caring for family members). It is therefore difficult, when considering 
the increase in prevalence among poorer quintiles and the decrease in prevalence among richer or 
middle quintiles, to say whether we are primarily seeing a redistribution of disease in accordance 
with socioeconomic factors, or a redistribution of wealth in accordance with sickness. Mishra et al 
(2007) attempt to control for this potential endogeneity problem by excluding households where 
HIV-positiǀe iŶdiǀiduals had ƌepoƌted ďeiŶg ͚seƌiouslǇ ill͛ foƌ thƌee oƌ ŵoƌe ŵoŶths of the pƌeǀious 
year, and found this adjustment had virtually no effect on the observed wealth association.  
NatuƌallǇ, Ŷeitheƌ ͚ǁealth͛ Ŷoƌ ͚poǀeƌtǇ͛ ĐaŶ ďe, iŶ theiƌ oǁŶ ƌight, a diƌeĐt cause of blood-borne 
disease: it is thus unsurprising that no firm conclusions can be drawn from this analysis in either 
direction. However, what does emerge is the existence and relevance of a multifaceted and 
changing relationship between wealth, poverty and HIV/AIDS, supporting (and supported by) the 
role of multiple channels and mechanisms in either direction. 
 
[Table 2 – The percentage who refused to provide a blood sample for HIV testing, by wealth 
quintile, for men and women] 
Of Đouƌse, ͚pƌeǀaleŶĐe͛ aŶd ͚iŶĐideŶĐe͛ aƌe Ŷot ĐoŶĐeptuallǇ iŶteƌĐhaŶgeaďle: it is haƌd to assess 
from this non-panel data how much we might attribute the consistently higher prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS among the wealthiest quintile of Tanzanian society to the risk factors relative wealth 
induces, and how much must be disregarded as simply representing the greater longevity of 
wealthier people who are HIV-positive, as compared with their poorer compatriots.  This emphasises 
the importance of the testing refusal. As Table 2 shows, testing refusal rates for every period 
demonstrate that the wealthiest are not more likely to agree to provide a blood sample for a HIV 
test. The large differences between the 2003/04 data and the other to surveys reflects a change in 
measurement methodology rather than rapid changes in social attitudes towards testing, though 
this may have been a factor.  In general, women are more likely to agree to a test than men, with 
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 Bloom et al 2001, cited in Bujra 2006; the authors note again that relative wealth is not a perfect proxy for 
class identity 
men in the wealthiest quintile the most likely to refuse a test in all three surveys. There have been 
significant changes over time for women in the wealthiest quintile, with the refusal rate dropping 
from 9.5% to 5.9% between the 2007/8 and 2011/12 surveys, though this reduction was not 
observed for men. Again, as with the prevalence data, the evidence reported here would seem to 
challenge standard assumptions around the behaviour of the wealthy.  This data is also telling as it is 
not based on self-reported data, rather this is data capturing what people actually do, removing any 
potential biases concerning the wealthy providing more socially acceptable answers, an issue that 
plagues self-reported data regarding sexual behaviour (Nnko et al. 2004) . 
Above all, there are four key points to summarise from our analysis. Firstly, that the overall decline 
in national prevalence rates is not consistently reflected across all population sub-groups. Secondly, 
that the dynamic distribution of prevalence is significantly different among women and men. Thirdly, 
that the shape of the distribution, and the distribution of the overall reduction in prevalence, is 
shifting through time and the spread may be narrowing, but relative wealth is still clearly of great 
relevance and it remains deeply inaccurate to characterise HIV/AIDS as a disease of poverty in Africa. 
Finally, data on testing refusal also poses a major problem for the poverty narrative, with the 
wealthiest consistently most likely to refuse testing.  
 
Reflections on the evidence 
Amongst the studies that focus on poverty, there are some explanations forwarded to explain the 
prevalence patterns discussed here. These include the notion that the wealthy are more mobile 
(Fenton, 2004), and have more chances to engage in extra-marital sexual encounters, that the 
wealthy have a greater ability to maintain concurrent relationships (Shelton et al 2005), and that due 
to a westernisation of lifestyles and patterns of urbanisation, they have greater access to multiple 
partners (Gillespie et al, 2007). However, beyond these suggestions, there is little, if any, research on 
this issue, emphasising the urgent need for this to be corrected in future studies. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, and reflective of the broader policy environment, the initial response by 
mainstream economics was also predominantly couched in the poverty narrative. Neoclassical 
analysis (by no means an extensive oeuvre) has failed to produce a convincing explanation for the 
distribution of HIV prevalence demonstrated in numerous large-scale studies, including this paper: 
this failure has severe consequences for effective policymaking. Problematic assumptions pervade 
rational-agent models (such as those of Philipson and Posner 1995, Oster 2005, Oster 2012), where 
sex – or unprotected sex – is treated as a freely negotiated contract, fully abstracted from the other 
social relations that connect both parties to each other and to wider social networks. Decision-
making about sex is reduced to a risk analysis of infection: intimacy, pleasure, childbearing and 
social/familial relations are conspicuous by their absence. This article does not pretend to conduct a 
comprehensive rebuttal of this work (Christensen 1998 provides an extensive account of the logical 
aŶd eŵpiƌiĐal pƌoďleŵs iŶ the assuŵptioŶs uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg PhilipsoŶ aŶd PosŶeƌ͛s ŵodel, ǁhiĐh 
(Gersowitz 2005) corroborates in an African context): suffice to say, it is of no surprise that a 
framework so narrow and lacking in context is incapable of explaining how wealth persistently 
correlates with higher prevalence, or why wealthier and better-informed (?) agents appear to 
dispƌopoƌtioŶatelǇ deĐliŶe testiŶg. PhilipsoŶ aŶd PosŶeƌ͛s ͚shadoǁ pƌiĐe͛ ĐoŶĐept of iŶfeĐtioŶ, aŶd 
Osteƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϮͿ eŵphasis oŶ the sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌole of ŶoŶ-HIV life expectancy in behavioural responses 
to a local epidemic, both lead problematically to the perception of longevity as a policy option: this 
renders the problem of HIV/AIDS rather circular, as shorter (non-HIV) life expectancy is seen to lead 
to high levels of HIV prevalence, whilst high prevalence rates contribute to a decrease in overall life 
expectancy.  
The most convincing explanations that address both the roles of wealth and poverty are rooted in 
the political economy tradition. Bujra (2006) places the AIDS crisis specifically within the context of 
class formation: the creation of a wage-labour class, with the attendant migration, social upheaval, 
aŶd seǀeƌiŶg of faŵilial aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ties aŶd Ŷoƌŵs; the eŵeƌgeŶĐe of a paƌasitiĐ ͚politiĐal Đlass͛ 
intent on consolidating their own power; and around these, other class fractions of professionals, of 
domestic labourers, and of  those working in the informal sector, dependent on the functioning of 
other groups for their own class survival. This creates two particular class-related tendencies which 
combine to shape ͚seǆual ŶetǁoƌkiŶg͛: fiƌstlǇ, suĐh Ŷetǁoƌks ƌepƌoduĐe aŶd ƌeiŶfoƌĐe Đlass fƌaĐtioŶs 
(marriage and procreation); secondly, these networks are used to assert power, typically via extra- 
or non-marital relations. Thus we can consider the specific mechanisms through which high HIV risk 
is mediated, in this context of major social transformation: migration, changes to family and 
community structures, and the broader scope for transactional sexual relations are experienced in 
varied but class-specific ways. 
Bujra (ibid) is scathing about the capacity of indexical accounts to fully capture relational dynamics, 
and not without reason: quintiles of relative wealth do not properly approximate the power 
dynamics between and within social classes as identified in the sociological tradition. However, we 
believe useful insight is also to be found in large-scale quantitative analysis: quantitative studies such 
as this one do inevitably suffer from some collapsing of analytical categories; we venture it not as an 
entire foundation of proof, but as one corroborating account. Data alone cannot possibly drive our 
understanding of social processes, but it can be very instructively discussed alongside relational 
accounts, and yet there have been very few attempts to combine this particular balancing act. Bujra 
disŵisses iŶdeǆiĐal fiŶdiŶgs as so peƌǀasiǀe theǇ aƌe ͚takeŶ foƌ gƌaŶted͛: ǁe ƌatheƌ fiŶd theŵ – and 
specifically the insistent correlation between high socioeconomic status and high prevalence – to be 
widely acknowledged and disregarded. 
A significant difference between the neoclassical accounts and a political economy approach is the 
oƌieŶtatioŶ of the foƌŵeƌ toǁaƌds a ĐoŶĐept of ageŶt ͚ĐhoiĐe͛, aŶd of the latteƌ toǁaƌds ageŶt 
͚ĐapaĐitǇ͛. HuŶteƌ ;ϮϬϬϮͿ aŶd LeĐleƌĐ-Madlala (2003) both write with reference to South Africa, but 
much of their insights should at least give us pause for thought in the Tanzanian context. 
ChaƌaĐteƌisiŶg ͚ĐapaĐitǇ͛ should Ŷot ďe ĐoŶstƌued as peƌpetuatiŶg a ͚passiǀe ǀiĐtiŵ͛ disĐouƌse, aŶd 
indeed both authors strongly acknowledge the agency of women in negotiating sex and relationships 
within a context of normalised transactional sex (Hunter 2002; Leclerc-Madlala 2003). Much has 
been made of the role of prostitution in transmission of HIV, but frequently in terms of easily-
identifiable sex work, loosely correlated with the desperation of poverty, with ignorance about HIV 
transmission or condom use – an approach which again fails to explain persistently high levels of 
prevalence among the wealthier members of Tanzanian society. Both authors, however, identify 
transactional sex as written into the very fabric of social relations: the privileged economic position 
of ŵeŶ ;uŶdeƌǁƌitteŶ ďǇ ďoth ͚tƌaditioŶal͛ aŶd Đapitalist ƌelatioŶsͿ, ŵasĐuliŶe disĐouƌses ǁhiĐh plaĐe 
high value on men having many sexual partners (likewise with roots or justifications to be found in a 
wide range of indigenous and Western-imported cultural factors), and the agency of women who 
ƌeĐogŶise a ĐoŵŵoditǇ ǀalue plaĐed oŶ seǆ aŶd eǆploit it to ŵeet theiƌ ŵateƌial ͚Ŷeeds͛ oƌ desires. 
The materiality of sexual relations is no longer perceived as contingent on desperate poverty, and 
economic considerations enter into the sexual decision-making of relatively wealthy women: the 
narrative becomes compatible with our data findings.  
Further implications  
This ĐaŶ of ǁoƌŵs ƌegaƌdiŶg ͚aďeƌƌaŶt͛ seǆual ďehaǀiouƌ as iŶ faĐt Ŷoƌŵal, pƌeǀaleŶt aŵoŶg the 
wealthy, and socially sanctioned along multiple cultural lines, is a discourse which implicates a high 
Ŷuŵďeƌ of ƌelatiǀelǇ ǁealthǇ ĐitizeŶs iŶ ͚ďad͛ ƌiskǇ seǆ ŵaǇ ǁell ƌepƌeseŶt too uŶsettliŶg aŶ 
introspection to be entertained seriously. However, failure, in academic or policy circles, to engage 
with intellectual honesty in discussions about the social relations driving HIV infection is problematic 
for appropriate research and policy. Following Hunter and Leclerc-Madlala͛s positioŶiŶg of toǆiĐ 
masculinities and the commodification of sex in the global context, a similar silence might well be 
only to be expected from powerful voices in the global North: the notion of normalised transactional 
seǆ aŶd aŶ eŵphatiĐ ďelief that fashioŶaďle Đlothes aŶd eǆpeŶsiǀe ĐellphoŶes aƌe ͚Ŷeeds͛ ƌatheƌ 
than luxuries may feel rather closer to hoŵe thaŶ aŶǇ ͚eduĐated͛ oƌ ͚sophistiĐated͛ ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌ, 
African or Western, wishes to feel about an epidemic. The possibility of such implicit concerns does 
not make for an environment hospitable to inquiry about the specific processes leading to 
persistently high rates of HIV prevalence in spite of education and condom access. In policy, much 
hinges upon the extent to which the more powerful groups in society (specifically, relatively wealthy 
men) perceive HIV/AIDS to be a personal threat, and the price they accord that threat as compared 
with the price of structural change. As Akeroyd (2004) asks, even if female empowerment were to 
suďstaŶtiallǇ ƌeduĐe the soĐial ƌisk of HIV iŶfeĐtioŶ, hoǁ does the loss of ŵale ͚poǁeƌ oǀeƌ͛ 
necessitated by female empowerment compare to this gain (Akeroyd 2004)? There are powerful 
beneficiaries of female precarity in the era of HIV/AIDS; agents and institutions for whom the 
circular relationship between inequality and HIV/AIDS is a rewarding one. 
Such a lack of rigorous engagement undermines the capacity of any approach aimed at unpicking 
and addressing the structural drivers of HIV: if the behaviour of the wealthy becomes difficult to 
disĐuss, the ͚stƌuĐtuƌal dƌiǀeƌs͛ ageŶda ŵelts too easilǇ ďaĐk iŶto the poǀeƌtǇ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe aŶd leaǀes us 
with piecemeal policies such as microfinance and conditional cash transfer schemes – approaches 
which can only comprehend the transmission of HIV within a context of absolute material 
deprivation, and within a very specific characterisation of gender and economic power. Whilst the 
ŵajoƌitǇ of ǁoŵeŶ͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ eŵpoǁeƌŵeŶt pƌogrammes include microfinance, it is clear that the 
notion of empowerment has taken on a distinct concrete form, with wealthy women excluded from 
this conceptualisation. This helps illustrate the way that structural interventions are being captured 
by individualised and reduced forms of intervention, with microfinance increasingly being labelled as 
a ͚stƌuĐtuƌal͛ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ. Further, this is an approach that focuses on protecting poor(er) women 
from wealthier men,  presented on a range of stylised assumptions about gendered roles (O'Laughlin 
2008). A ͚structural͛ intervention would address the underlying social structures, processes and 
ƌelatioŶs that shape ǁoŵeŶ͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ ŵeŶ iŶ geŶeƌal, ƌatheƌ thaŶ siŵplǇ 
ŵediatiŶg iŶdiǀidual iŵpoǀeƌished ǁoŵeŶ͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ depeŶdeŶĐe oŶ ŵeŶ ǁithiŶ the eǆistiŶg 
distƌiďutioŶ of ;aĐĐess toͿ ƌesouƌĐes. This ĐƌeepiŶg Đaptuƌe of ͚stƌuĐtuƌal͛ responses illustrates the 
pƌeĐaƌitǇ of BaǇlies͛ ;ϮϬϬϬͿ optiŵistiĐ ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that, siŶĐe the Ŷatuƌe of the paŶdeŵiĐ so ĐleaƌlǇ 
implicates structural inequality, it also makes structural change both possible and necessary : there 
is no failsafe mechanism to ensure that such structural change will occur.  
Theƌe aƌe fuƌtheƌ possiďle ͚loseƌs͛ fƌoŵ a ƌadiĐal ƌethiŶk of HIV/AID“ poliĐǇ.  HuŶsŵaŶŶ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ 
ideŶtifies the politiĐal eĐoŶoŵǇ of aŶ ͚AID“ iŶdustƌǇ͛ ǁhiĐh foƌŵs aŶ effeĐtiǀe politiĐal ĐoŶstitueŶĐǇ 
for no change to existing infection prevention policies: powerful advocates are concerned to 
ŵaiŶtaiŶ theiƌ oǁŶ fuŶdiŶg stƌeaŵs, aŶd ͚outsideƌ͛ gƌoups, poteŶtiallǇ puƌsuiŶg appƌoaĐhes ǁhiĐh 
are more long-term or more appropriate to the changed needs of the changing epidemic, can be 
disparate and powerless (Hunsmann 2012). This path-dependency in policy can create tensions 
between short-run and long-run approaches. The social costs faced by civil society, of both HIV/AIDS 
and policies targeted at it, may be greatly mismatched with the costs (and benefits) as perceived by 
policy-makers; incentives and timescales in politics can conflict with the long-term interests of the 
society they govern. For Hunsmann, therefore, a structural response to a structural problem is to 
focus on re-shaping the context of policy-making in the hope of this leading to better long-term 
policies – rather than the common efforts of struggling against the incremental nature of policy-
making in search of silver bullets. Whilst it may be difficult to follow up this astute identification of 
the problem of existing approaches, it points to the challenges of re-orienting policy to address the 
prevalence, behaviour, and testing and counselling habits of wealthy men, in the context in which 
policy is predominantly being dictated by wealthy men who are likely to divert attention from their 
own social group, and who have incentives for the perpetuation of the poverty paradigm. 
The account we put forward is emphatically not one of determinism; it is also not one that provides 
an easy solution. Above all, our intention is to draw attention to questions barely asked in research 
and policy, and even less answered: why does policy seem not to target wealthy women, when they 
are consistently experiencing the highest rates of prevalence? How might it do so? How closely do 
ouƌ ͚stƌuĐtuƌal͛ iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs fit the stƌuĐtuƌal, soĐial pƌoĐesses uŶdeƌlǇiŶg HIV tƌaŶsŵissioŶ? The 
data on testing refusal again recalls the limitations of rational agent models for policy-makers, 
because revealed behaviour does not correspond as anticipated by such models: why are wealthy 
men least willing to know their serostatus? This is an early result we advance with some caution: it is 
unclear to what extent these findings can be extrapolated to the general population, as there are a 
range of other factors which may mean that the wealthy do in fact test more, such as access to 
testing facilities in urban areas or hospital visits in which patients can be routinely tested for HIV 
(Obermeyer et al. 2013). Nonetheless, this brings into question whether wealthy individuals may be 
more likely to test beĐause of siŵilaƌ ͚ƌatioŶal͛ ďehaǀiouƌs that aƌe ƌefleĐted iŶ ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ 
economic models, or whether this is just a matter of access. Further, this again challenges stylised 
negative views of uninformed choices made by poor people.   Nonetheless, other issues, such as the 
stigma around testing for HIV, and concerns over what may happen if the test of positive (Matovu et 
al. 2014), will not just apply to the poor.  The data at least suggests that assumptions around testing 
and wealth should be treated with caution. Further, this has implications for transmission, as 
wealthy men have higher rates of HIV and are as likely to refuse a test in comparison to the men in 
the other four wealth quintiles. Indeed, recent data suggests that men are less likely than women to 
ďe oŶ A‘V͛s (UNAIDS 2013). More research is needed urgently on this matter to assess whether 
these testing refusal patterns are reflective of the general population. 
 
Conclusion 
Our findings therefore contribute to, and reflect, the burgeoning understanding of HIV/AIDS as a 
dynamic and complex phenomenon (Gupta et al. 2008; Auerbach et al. 2010; Auerbach et al. 2011), 
closely related to and strongly influenced by gender and wealth – and more precisely, the specific 
social relations and structural mechanisms relating these rather abstract concepts to real life in 
contemporary Tanzania. They reflect the role of both relative wealth and relative poverty, as 
structural drivers of illness, and as mediators of policy responses. They highlight not only the uneven 
distribution of HIV/AIDS but also the uneven distribution of the headline rate of decline among 
different groups of the population; and they reŵiŶd us that the ͚pƌogƌess͛ of the epideŵiĐ is ofteŶ 
non-linear (as in the increase in prevalence for some groups, or the revived monotonic wealth-
prevalence relationship among women in 2011-12). Academic and policy responses need to take 
into account not only the complexity of this nexus, but also its rapid dynamism if they are to offer 
relevant explanations or solutions. Further, to talk of a ͚liŶk͛ ďetǁeeŶ eitheƌ, oƌ ďoth, poǀeƌtǇ aŶd 
prevalence or wealth and prevalence, is overly simplistic. This aggregate-level investigation only 
confirms the relevance of socioeconomic factors to an irreducibly socioeconomic phenomenon. The 
critical task is to explore the varied channels through which relative wealth and gender shape risk, 
behaviour, and constraints. The broad bƌushstƌokes of ͚geŶdeƌ͛, ͚ǁealth͛, ͚poǀeƌtǇ͛ aŶd eǀeŶ ͚Đlass͛ 
provide only the crucial backdrop against which context-specific mechanisms can be construed. 
Mainstream economic models are consistently failing to help us understand the epidemic. The 
͚ƌatioŶal͛ ŵodel of ďehaǀiouƌ is ĐoŶtƌadiĐted ďǇ the eǀideŶĐe aƌouŶd testiŶg ƌefusal, uŶdeƌŵiŶiŶg 
the view that we do not need to be concerned about the wealthy. In fact, these findings indicate 
that more research, and more attention to wealth, is required: in particular, the evidence illustrates 
that wealthy women are missing from responses to the epidemic and need re-including. 
One of the clearest and repeated inferences from this research is that a significant gap remains 
between the most aggregated quantitative analysis, which can help indicate the most affected social 
groups but are limited in their capacity to explain how this risk is embodied, and much closer 
Ƌualitatiǀe aŶalǇsis ǁhiĐh deǀelops ŶuaŶĐed theoƌies of hoǁ ͚ƌisk gƌoups͛ aŶd ͚ƌisk ďehaǀiouƌs͛ ĐaŶ 
iŶteƌaĐt to foƌŵ ͚ƌisk situatioŶs͛ ďut ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe ǀeƌǇ teŶtatiǀelǇ geŶeƌalised. 
Bujƌa ;ϮϬϬϲͿ is ĐoƌƌeĐt to eŵphasise that ͚ƌelatiǀe ǁealth͛ is aŶ iŵpeƌfeĐt pƌoǆǇ foƌ Đlass, aŶd to 
neglect class relations necessarily renders incomplete any analysis of an epidemic driven almost 
entirely by social-sexual relations and thus by the power dynamics governing these relations. Further 
work remains to continue developing a gendered class-based analysis which is structural and non-
deterministic, and which is compatible with the observed statistical distribution of prevalence as it 
changes through time. As HIV/AIDS is long-run and permanent (since infection is irreversible), and 
policy-sensitive, including in indirect or unanticipated ways, the specifics of context need to play a 
stronger role in modelling: for example, migration and the issues it raises and policies it is affected 
by (labour market, housing, restructuring of communal and familial relations) cuts across gender and 
class and is profoundly shaped by both, but is also a factor and pathway in its own right. 
A further need is primarily methodological: as Johnston (2013) points out, cohort studies enable 
ŵoƌe ƌeliaďle data, addƌessiŶg the diffiĐulties aƌisiŶg fƌoŵ the distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚iŶĐideŶĐe͛ aŶd 
͚pƌeǀaleŶĐe͛: Đohoƌt studies ǁould eŶaďle us to saǇ ŵoƌe ĐoŶfideŶtlǇ ǁhetheƌ a ƌelatiǀe deĐƌease iŶ 
a giǀeŶ gƌoup͛s pƌeǀaleŶĐe is due to feǁeƌ Ŷeǁ iŶfeĐtioŶs, higheƌ ŵoƌtalitǇ, oƌ aŶ iŶĐoŵe effeĐt 
whereby households have systematically been reclassified to a different wealth quintile. However, 
the practicalities involved in such a study are severe, especially at a large scale and with an eye to 
ensuring broad coverage especially with regard to destitute or highly-mobile respondents. 
Furthermore, as Johnston also notes, the few existing such studies still yield contradictory results 
across the same region, so it is also clear that such research is no panacea. However, it could still 
provide an important yardstick for data such as that used here, where incidence has to be estimated 
from the more easily measurable prevalence. 
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